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　The article is devoted the characteristics of institutional trust in Russia. It is 
connected with the emergence of precariat - a new social class. In Russia this class 
includes people who are constantly （!） engaged in informal, temporary, sporadic jobs, in 
the «shadow» - nonlegitimized sector of the labor market wherein they have truncated 
social rights and an inferior social status. The role and importance of this class is 
growing, because numerically these groups are constantly growing. Sociological 
research conﬁrms a considerable inﬂuence of this class on the situation in contemporary 
Russian society. This is particularly evident in institutional trust, seriously differing from 
that of other social strata. The article shows existing differences in institutional trust 
between the higher class, middle class and precariat. An attempt is made to explain the 
reasons for different assessments of social and political institutions by these classes. 
Institutional trust of precariat compared to other social classes has its own peculiarities: 
sharper requirements for justice, a sense of insecurity, loss of future perspective and a 
desire to achieve fundamental changes in society. These new aspects of institutional 
trust are considered as exampliﬁed in Russia.
Key words: trust, institutional trust, society, social class, precariat, Russia
　Before discussing institutional trust of precariat in Russian society, let me explain the 
emergence of this new class, its structure, its features and, accordingly, reveal its new features 
that shape specificity of this trust. According to expert data, the total number of precarious 
groups reaches 45-50％ of all employed in the current Russian economy. These groups make up 
a new social class that goes a long way to determine the character of modern society. Sociological 
studies show that the role of this class in solving the fate of Russian society is growing: its 
inﬂuence is felt in all spheres of public life, especially in politics and economics. Its （dis-） trust is 
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increasingly having an impact on the fate of perspective and current problems in Russian society.
Who makes up the precariat?
　The word precariat blends two words - the Latin precarium （unstable, not guaranteed） and 
the word proletariat which in its time denoted the social class alienated from the results of its 
labor and subjected to exploitation by the ruling class, the bourgeoisie. At present this group 
represents a significant stratum in many countries, accounting for 40-45％ of the able-bodied 
population.
　Primarily, precariat consists of the able-bodied people employed in the informal, shadow 
economy, whose share in the gross domestic product is 33％. This social group which in Russia 
accounts for an estimated 20-30％ of the able-bodied population has no guarantees of stable 
employment. Especially lots of people employed in this kind of labor work in the services, in 
construction and transportation. Members of these groups do not have or have limited social and 
labor rights, they have no paid leave. This is compounded by a virtual lack of opportunities for 
career growth. They cannot count on assistance in acquiring housing. Childcare is their personal 
problem just as education and upgrading of skills. For the majority of those who are engaged in 
informal shadow work, this condition becomes a constant value that connects them all their lives.
　Secondly, people permanently doing temporary jobs, working part-time or eking out 
their incomes by seasonal or “gig”  jobs, also constitute precariat. According to expert data, 
the number of this social group is 14-16％. This type of employment is inherent not only for 
private, but state-owned enterprises, not only for shadow economy but also the formal, ofﬁcial 
economy. This phenomenon permits to hide the true scale of unemployment. In most cases these 
people have to agree to work shorter hours. Practice shows that they have to work more and get 
smaller remuneration than they count on. Moreover, many members of that group often discover 
that they are subjected to greater exploitation and self-exploitation not matching their 
remuneration. In Russia, for example, this was dramatically manifested in the so called 
optimization of teachersʼ work in higher education and other institutions when under the pretext 
of social concern they were switched to shorter hours with a disproportionately increased labor 
intensity. That group is stuck in a situation when they suffer from various restrictions forcing 
them to look for another job. Such change of employment is becoming more and more 
widespread. A nationwide survey The Living World of Russians conducted by the Russian State 
University for the Humanities （October 2014） on a sample of 1,800 people in 8 regions revealed 
such an odd fact that 12.2％ of them do not work for the profession （specialty）, for which they 
202 中央大学社会科学研究所年報 第 22 号
were trained, and 26.6％ stated partial compliance of work and profession （Toshchenko, 2016: 
354）.
　Thirdly, precariat is made up of jobless people; their number is also considerable, especially 
in crisis years. Thus, in the wake of the 2008 crisis, unemployment shot up 50％ in 2009 
amounting to almost 6 million （Russian Statistical Yearbook, 2012）. A similar situation existed 
in 2014-2017 in connection with crisis phenomena in the economy, sanctions against Russia and 
falling oil prices. Experts believe that real unemployment is 3.5 to 7 times higher than registered 
unemployment. Sergey Glazyev, academician of the RAS and adviser to the Russiaʼs President, 
believes that “hidden unemployment stands at 20 million”  （Istomin, 2015）. It has to be noted 
that hidden unemployment is also disguised due to reluctance to get registered, odd jobs, 
seasonal employment in private, typically agricultural jobs.
　Fourth, precariat includes people in the so-called creative professions, specialists in 
information technologies, programmers, etc. engaged in freelance work （Strebkov and 
Shevchuk, 2010）. They are sometimes presented as freedom-loving people independent from 
rigorous and petty-fogging regulations of official （state, joint stock, private） enterprises and 
organizations （Kosugi, 2008）. However, nonconformism and lack of daily external monitoring 
does not prevent their vaunted and in some ways attractive independence from being blighted by 
the same constraints as the whole of the precariat ― vulnerability, lack of social guarantees, 
loneliness in distress, lack of stability and a sense of insecurity.
　Fifth, similar precarious characteristics can be applied to people engaged in borrowed labor, 
that is, hired as staff members to fulﬁll orders or render services for other ﬁrms （enterprises, 
organizations） （Kozina, 2013）.
　Sixth, some migrants, whose numbers are considerable in many countries, including Russia, 
come close to being part of the precariat. Many of them have their rights infringed upon, have 
lower pay and are denied many social benefits. They are often victims if not of overt, then 
indirect ethnic and religious discrimination （Gibney, 2010; Malakhov, 2015）.
　And, finally, the ranks of the precariat are swelled by interns and some students who seek to 
achieve stable positions in society and within their profession. These young people are prepared 
to take odd jobs for which they are often overqualified and which fall short of their justified 
claims to a worthier place in life （London Business School, 2009; Zubok and Chuprov, 2015）.
　According to vice-prime minister of Russian government Olʼga Golodets, these social groups 
create a situation, when “our labor market is practically illegitimate, and only a small part of it 
functions according to normal rules.”  Of the 76 million able-bodied population there are no data 
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as to where, what and how 38 million Russians are doing and their living conditions and incomes 
are not reﬂected in ofﬁcial statistics （Golodets, 2013）.
　Thus, in the late 20th - early 21st centuries groups emerged in Russia, as well as all over 
the world, of the so-called precariat, a new social class, characterized by informal, shadow, 
sporadic jobs, temporary or part-time employment as their intransient, constant and 
enduring condition.And it has to be noted that its numbers are constantly growing, including 
persons who hold permanent jobs and are often referred to as the middle class.
　Analysis of the state of employment suggests that precariat is a new coinage denoting the 
social stratum that embodies alienation not only from the results of its labor, but from the 
society. The members of this new class are exposed to particularly sophisticated forms of 
exploitation of their labor, knowledge and skills. The quality of their life suffers ultimately. 
Generally in Russia there are signiﬁcant social groups that are in this disadvantaged position.
　In conclusion, I would like to offer an analysis of the structure of precariat by briefly 
mentioning those researchers who first began to study this phenomenon. Since precariat has 
become an integral part of economy in many countries, its role and place in social life began to be 
studied by social scholars especially through the 1980s. Among them I would like to name ﬁrst of 
all Pierre Bourdieu. He broadened out the problem by including in his analysis the growing mass 
of workers engaged in temporary and odd jobs. That was when the word precariat ﬁrst appeared 
to denote workers with unstable employment, lack of guaranteed social beneﬁts and vulnerability 
in difﬁcult periods （Bourdieu, 1998）. These strata attracted attention of other scholars, such as 
Zigmund Bauman （Bauman, 1998）, Jurgen Habermas （Habermas, 1985）, Michael Hardt and 
Antonio Negri （Hardt and Negri, 2000）. The comprehension of this phenomenon led Guy 
Standing to the fact that in his work he carried out an analysis of these new social strata, calling 
them a precariat （Standing, 2011）. Russian scholars too moved closer to understanding the new 
situation （Golenkova and Gollyusova, 2013; Shkaratan et al., 2015; Toshchenko, 2015）.
　The analysis of the work of these researchers allows us to conclude that they agree with the 
fact that the precariat includes itself people who are constantly （!） engaged in temporary, 
sporadic jobs, are engaged in the shadow or nonlegitimized sector of the labor market owing to 
which they have truncated social rights and an inferior social status.
　However, we can not agree, that some researchers （Potter, 2002:18; Patterson,1999:191） do 
not clearly distinguish between the precarious groups and marginal segments of the population. 
The main difference is that the precariat considers itself an integral part of society, strives to 
maintain and strengthen its social position, claims to actively participate in solving economic and 
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political problems, while marginalized groups have accepted their low status behavior, are passive 
in protecting their own civil rights and freedoms, often embodying and implementing various 
forms of deviant behavior.
　The size and quantity of precariat allows us to conclude that it occupies a signiﬁcant place in 
the social development. According to sociological research, an attitude of different precarious 
groups to all processes taking place in society, participation in public life manifests itself in such a 
phenomenon as trust. It should be noted that in sociology, including Russian, “trust has been an 
important, although not always an explicit, element in those sociological theories which have 
addressed the question of how to preserve diversity and still maintain social order”  （Misztal, 
1996: 25）.
Essence and main features of institutional trust in Russia
　Trust has many aspects of its analysis. In most cases, the researchers proceeded from the 
assumption that “the trust has several kinds of its manifestation ― personal, collective and 
institutional”  （Sasaki and March, 2012）.
　Trust in key political and social institutions is an important factor in the development of 
society. In this regard, the study of the speciﬁcity of the trust of the population or its collective 
and individual communities （groups） in relation to social institutions is actualized, especially to 
those who realize the functions of power and inﬂuence in society. In our opinion, institutional 
trust plays an especially important role in the structure of trust.The peculiarity of this trust is 
that it can be based on various prerequisites: the experience of interaction with the institutions 
of political power, the evaluation of their real activity or significance for society, loyalty, 
personalization of the institutions, identiﬁcation with the values  transmitted by the institutions.
　However, institutional trust is seriously differentiated. “The amount of trust that people vest in 
various institutions differ among societies, it also undergoes changes in time”  （Sztompka, 1999: 
44）.
　Before proceeding to the analysis of the trust of the precariat, we will consider how it changed 
when its level and extent of manifestation among the population of Russia was clariﬁed. Such an 
approach will make it possible to present both general and speciﬁc features of institutional trust 
more clearly （see Table-1）.
　If we consider these data, then it can be noted that during the crisis and the application of 
economic sanctions, there has been a decrease in trust to virtually all social institutions. This 
happened because measures were not fully implemented to create conditions to build trust. “In 
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essence, the problem of constituting trust in society is the issue of the conditions necessary for 
social order and human action to continue”  （Misztal, 1996: 25）.
　The fact that the relevant conditions were not created is indicated by a sharp decrease trust 
（by one and a half times） in Parliament （the State Duma and the Federation Council）. In our 
opinion, this is due to the incomprehensible policy for the population to solve social problems ― 
pension reform, housing and utilities. A similar sharp condemnation was also suffered by local 
Table-1　Dynamics of Institutional Trust, 2014-2017 （percent of respondents）
Institution
2014
October
2015
March
2015
October
2016
March
2016
October
2017
May
2017
October
President of the Russian 
Federation
78 78 75 72 67 72 69
Government of Russian 
Federation
56 49 52 38 40 43 38
Head of the region 48 43 43 30 31 36 34
Local government 34 27 29 22 20 28 26
State Duma of Russian 
Federation
32 29 32 22 22 25 24
Council of the Federation 
of Russian Federation
34 30 30 22 23 27 26
Political parties 17 17 17 12 15 18 16
Police 28 32 32 29 31 35 33
Press （newspapers, 
magazines）
33 30 30 30 27 30 25
TV 44 38 37 35 35 35 32
Russian army 62 65 65 67 65 67 63
Trade union 26 24 27 22 23 29 23
Judicial system 24 26 26 22 24 26 25
Orthodox Church 50 50 51 47 46 51 42
Public and human rights 
organizations
37 35 34 31 31 36 33
Sources:  The Russian Society in 2017: Social well-being, Anxieties, Hopes for the Future. M .: Institute of Sociology RAS. 
2017.
Note: In October 2017, 4,000 representative samples of the population, aged 18 and older representing the main social and 
professional groups of the population and those living in all territorial and economic regions of the country in different 
types of settlements were interviewed.
206 中央大学社会科学研究所年報 第 22 号
authorities, which weakly defended the interests of the population. In fact, this branch of public 
power agreed with the unjustified reduction of health and education institutions, which was 
carried out under the banner of optimizing the work of these organizations. Particularly note 
worthy was the decrease in trust in the ideological tools of political power ― the media: the 
credibility of them decreased by one third. Such a decline in trust happened because they took a 
passive and/or conciliatory policy when the political authorities implemented unpopular social 
reforms.
　As for such social institutions as political parties, trade unions, public organizations for the 
protection of human rights and freedoms, the level of trust in them has not changed, which 
indicates a low degree of their inﬂuence on the solution of problems of concern to the population. 
These institutions can not acquire the authority and inﬂuence that they have in many democratic 
countries.
　Analyzing the trust in the President, we note that it remains high, although it decreased by 9 
points. However, the presidential election in March 2018 returned the previous level of conﬁdence 
― it was supported by more than 76％ of voters. In our opinion, this is due, ﬁrstly, to the fact that 
he openly recognized the social and economic situation in the country as unsatisfactory. In 
addition, he said that he will make a sharp turn, as he put it “breakthrough” , aimed primarily at 
improving the well-being of the people. His success in the elections is also due to the fact that 
many people saw in his foreign policy the return of Russia to the status of a great power, which 
could not help reviving the feelings of patriotism and pride for the country.
　Analyzing general data on institutional trust, it should be noted that the high level of trust is 
experienced by the army （63％） and the Orthodox Church （42％）. The trust in the army, in our 
opinion, is based, on the one hand, on the traditional respect in Russia for a soldier and ofﬁcer, 
the recognition of their merits in defending the fatherland, including during the thousand-year 
history and its victories. This is largely contributed to the memory of the Second World War, in 
which the Soviet army defeated such a major opponent as German fascism. On the other hand, 
the desire of Russians to ensure that Russia was a world power is connected with their 
representation about the successful defense of the state interests in the modern world. People 
have supported its actions for the annexation of the Crimea, as well as during the fighting in 
Syria. As for the Orthodox Church, her actions are associated with her striving to ﬁght for the 
moral image of population, to ﬁght for justice, for the peaceful and coordinated development of 
society.
　However, these generalized data conceal a great differentiation if we consider institutional 
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trust from the standpoint of social stratification. Letʼs pay attention to the fact that many 
researchers have argued, social stratification plays an important role in the differentiation of 
institutional trust （Patterson, 1999; Potter, 2002:18）. Such differentiating moment in institutional 
trust was the emergence along with the traditional social strata of the significant precarious 
groups of the population that are occupying an unstable position. These groups occupy a 
significant place in the social structure of Russian society and are playing an increasing and 
growing role in the formation of institutional trust. Consider this in more detail.
Peculiarities of the institutional trust of the precariat in Russia
　Since precariat represents signiﬁcant segments of the population, including not only industry 
workers, service workers, but also qualified specialists in the sphere of economy, education, 
medicine, culture and art, institutional trust becomes an important feature of their social and 
practical life. In the present period of time this trust becomes paramount because it acquires a 
special and decisive role in achieving social justice, social well-being, the primacy of human rights 
and freedoms.
　Speaking about the essence of institutional trust, we recall that it can be defined as the 
expectation by the social community that the functioning of the institution, as well as the 
behavior of the people representing them, will be predictable, consistent with general norms and 
rules, and will not cause harm.
　Speaking of institutional trust of precariat, we draw attention to the fact that this social class 
（some authors call it precarious community and groups （see: Ullmann-Margalit, 2004:79）） 
constitutes significant strata, the initial characteristic of which is that they embody social 
inequality: they are poor, they do not have stable employment and guaranteed income. Many of 
them are deprived or restricted in social protection, they live in constant anxiety for the 
preservation of their well-being.
　Recall that the precarious groups make up almost half of the able-bodied population and, 
because of their size and importance, exert a great inﬂuence on the social, political and cultural 
situation, which manifests itself in varying degrees of trust when compared with other social 
groups. And this difference differs signiﬁcantly （see Table-2）.
　An analysis of these data reveals profound differences in the level and degree of trust between 
the precariat and other social communities. This is all the more important, if compared with the 
all-Russian data, which alleviate these very serious differences. For a deeper interpretation of 
these data, it is comparable to data for the entire Russian population as a whole, in order to 
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represent the seriousness of this difference.
　What underlies such serious differences in institutional trust?
　The main conclusion that can be drawn from the data of Tables 1 and 2, is that the precariat 
expresses a sufﬁciently low degree of trust to virtually all institutions, especially political ones, in 
comparison with other social communities. This is even more important because all-Russian data 
Table-2　Institutional Trust of High, Middle and Poor Class （Precariat） （percent of respondents）
Institutions
Well provided
（higher class）
Satisfactory provided
（middle class）
Poorly provided 
（precariat）
President of Russian 
Federation
82 72 47
Government of 
Russian Federation
57 38 19
Head of the region 50 35 16
Local government 45 25 11
State Duma of 
Russian Federation
43 23 9
Council of the 
Federation of Russian 
Federation
43 25 12
Political parties 26 15 10
Police 43 35 20
Press （newspapers, 
magazines）
35 25 17
TV 40 32 26
Russian army 65 65 54
Trade union 33 22 14
Judicial system 35 26 14
Orthodox Church 45 42 42
Public and human 
rights organizations
47 31 25
Sources:  The Russian society in 2017: Social well-being, Anxieties, Hopes for the Future. M .: Institute of Sociology RAS. 
2017.
Note: In October 2017, 4,000 representative samples of the population, aged 18 and older representing the main social and 
professional groups of the population and those living in all territorial and economic regions of the country in different 
types of settlements were interviewed.
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levels this difference. However, this relatively low level of trust differs in relation to different 
institutions.
　First, worth attention is the fact that in relation to the highest organs of political power, 
precariat is almost twice less trusted in comparison with the higher and middle classes. It is 
significant that in 2014, after the accession of the Crimea and in connection with economic 
sanctions against Russia, there was an increase in trust in the president of the country. However, 
the past three and a half years have shown that the economic situation has worsened: the number 
of poor from 12 million people in 2014 increased to 22.5 million in 2017. At the same time, the 
number of billionaires （oligarchs） reached 110 persons, increasing 17 persons from 2014 to 2017. 
The concentration of economic wealth has increased by 1％ of the population and incomes have 
increased over the years to 70％ of national wealth. Such a differentiation of the material 
situation did not go unnoticed. And the conﬁdence of the poor in that “The poor get poorer and 
the rich get richer”  manifested itself in a decrease in conﬁdence in the highest authorities. The 
pro-active layers of the population are growing convinced that the highest authorities in the 
person of both the president and the government do not show political will to solve the country's 
economic problems. As a result, the trust in the highest executive （government） and legislative 
authorities （the State Duma and the Federation Council, i.e. the parliament of the country） is 3-5 
times lower than in the upper class, and 2-3 times lower compared to the middle classes.
　All this allows us to state that the general indicators of trust in the highest authorities in 2017 
（69％ for the president, 38％ for the government, 24-26％ for the parliament） conceal the deep 
differentiation of the main social groups in relation to these authorities and 82％ and 47％ 
respectively trust the president, respectively, the government 57％ and 19％, respectively ― 
43％ and 9-12％ respectively）. Such a state of trust allows us to talk about the possible growth of 
social tension in society.
　Second, sociological data indicate a low level of trust of precariat to regional authorities （16％） 
and local self-government （11％）. It is 3-4 times lower in comparison with the trust of the higher 
and middle class （respectively 50％ and 45％）. Why did this happen? In our opinion, the decrease 
in trust in these bodies of the power vertical occurred because in the years of market reforms on 
the ground, so-called measures to optimize education and healthcare organizations began to be 
implemented. In practice, in real life, it meant the closure of schools and health-care centers in 
sparsely populated areas. This led to the fact that the number of educational institutions 
decreased from 69.7 thousand （1990） to 44.1 thousand （2015）, and the number of paramedical 
and obstetric （medical） points from 47.7 thousand （1990） to 35 thousand （2015）. At the same 
210 中央大学社会科学研究所年報 第 22 号
time, the number of libraries decreased （from 42,200 to 30,600）, clubs and other places of 
cultural leisure （from 62,600 to 36,900） （Toshchenko, 2016）.
　But since these aspects of the vital world are very important for daily life, their liquidation or 
contraction has led to a drop in trust, because people did not see the protection of their interests 
from regional and local authorities, their desire to delve into the complex aspects of social 
protection. The result of these actions was the growth of social tension, led to numerous protests. 
The incarnation of this mistrust was made by the proletarian strata, because before the middle 
and higher classes these problems （with training, health care, and culture） were not so acute ― 
they were solved by others and for them in relatively painless ways.
　Third, the attitude of the population towards those structures that ensure the legal provision of 
human rights and freedoms plays a signiﬁcant role in trusting the ofﬁcial authority. Analysis of 
the data in Table 1 and Table 2 shows, on the whole, a certain increase in the conﬁdence in the 
police among the general population. However, the precariat more than twice has a low level of 
trust （20％） compared with the upper class （43％）. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that the 
judicial system in Russia has not yet become a full-fledged third form of power and is highly 
dependent on the executive power. To this is added arbitrariness in relation to the demands of 
the population, a huge bureaucratization, a formalism in the work, that the poor are treated as 
trampling on their rights. Therefore, it is not surprising that only one in seven （14％） has 
conﬁdence in the judicial system.
　Fourth, there continues to be a drop in trust in organizations that embody the information 
openness, the truth of the information reported, the observance of authenticity and the 
observance of the moral rules of journalism. Among the first layers of trust in the media 
（newspapers and magazines） are experiencing only 17％. Somewhat higher their conﬁdence in 
television （26％）. In our opinion, this is due to the fact that most newspapers （especially large 
ones） occupy a pro-government position, while with the help of the Internet readers and viewers 
have a richer choice of programs professing different points of view.
　Fifth, low is level of trust, which personifies （in part） the interests of civil society. We are 
talking about political parties and trade unions. But their authority is insigniﬁcant. In 2014-2017, 
15-17％ of the population trusted political parties （but only 10％ of the pre-revolutionary strata）. 
Such a low level of trust is due to the fact that the multi-party system in Russia has not become a 
truly democratic phenomenon. Political parties are put in such conditions that they basically play 
a decorative role. All their initiatives are either blocked or appropriated by the ruling party. If 
these opportunities manifest themselves, then only at the local level, when opposition parties 
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manage to hold their representatives and get a majority in this or that municipal council. But 
even in this case, because of the limited ﬁnancial resources, it is rarely possible for them to put 
their ideas into practice. And in this case, the paradox clearly shows itself: where trust has to 
show itself in the most obvious way through the involvement of the population in solving local 
problems, it is almost the lowest in comparison with the trust in other political and social 
institutions.
　In conclusion, we note, analyzing institutional trust, some researchers are paying attention to, 
on the one hand, a rational, balanced assessment of the real activity of social institutions on the 
basis of one's own or other people's experience （based on one's own competence, awareness, 
authoritative opinion, life experience （Kozyreva and Smirnov, 2015））, on the other hand, cultural 
and emotional assessment based more on faith than experience （Giddens, 1992; Potter, 2002; 
Moskvin, 2011）. Institutional trust combines at the same time two elements: the recognition of 
symbolic importance, signiﬁcance （the notion of ideal functioning） and evaluation of real activity 
（in case of inconsistency with the idea of the ideal - disappointment）. These elements can be 
combined in different proportions, as a result, when evaluating a particular institution, one of 
them comes to the fore （Gudkov, 2012）.
　Despite the discrepancies in the estimates obtained in different studies, and some ﬂuctuations 
in the level of trust over time, the overall structure, composition of the institutional trust of 
Russians has remained stable over the past few years since 1993. However, its level varies 
significantly among representatives of different social groups （differing by level of well-being, 
age, type of settlement, information （Gudkov, 2012）, education （Nathov, 2011） and other 
characteristics （Smirnov, 2009）.
　The question of the optimal level of institutional trust / mistrust that is desirable for the society 
remains controversial. Some researchers （Vakhtina, 2011; Kiselev, 2014） emphasize that a high 
level of institutional trust is a condition for the effectiveness of institutions, a guarantee of their 
normal functioning, a factor of social development, a guarantor of stability, a prerequisite for 
progress. Others （Obolonsky, 2012; Papakostas, 2016） draw attention to the need to preserve the 
population's critical attitude towards the authorities and various institutions. It is emphasized 
that extreme forms of expression of trust and mistrust are equally ﬂawed and undesirable. They 
emphasize that it is mistrust that has a constructive potential, acts as the civic duty of every 
individual and a manifestation of true patriotism. A sound, rational skepticism in the perception 
and evaluation of institutions in combination with a high level of interpersonal trust （between 
fellow citizens） corresponds to the democratic ideals of the social order. As a possible consensus, 
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the question of the need to search for the optimal boundaries of institutional trust （Kozyreva and 
Smirnov, 2015）, emphasizes that extreme trust and mistrust are equally bad and undesirable.
　Let us also note that the sphere of labor can mitigate or strengthen political trust, but it does 
not determine it at all. As demonstrated by （Clement, 2015）, within professional groups there is 
a signiﬁcant differentiation in terms of the level of political trust, involvement in public life and 
social activity.
　Thus this situation is largely due to the fact that the level and quality of institutional trust 
depends on who and with what intensity it expresses, by what criteria are assessed the most 
diverse political and social institutions.
　All this allows us to conclude that the state and dynamics of institutional trust in Russia is a 
rather variegated and contradictory picture. In our opinion, we can agree with the conclusion of 
the researchers （Auzan, 2013; Sztompka, 2017） who argue that a balanced and successful path of 
development of the country will be ensured when the trust of the people and their main social 
groups reaches 60％ of the main social institutions. And this means that all institutions should 
formulate a program of strategic and tactical actions to achieve this level of trust, and ﬁrst of all 
from the side of precarious strata （communities, groups） that have taken such a signiﬁcant place 
in the social structure of society.
　This project was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation （project No. 18-18-00024）.
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